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Abstract4
Econometric modelling of decision uncertainty has received extensive attention in the5
contingent valuation literature, but these methods are not directly transferable to the6
realm of multi-attribute stated preference studies. In this paper, an integrated choice and7
latent variable model tracing the impact of decision uncertainty on the valuation of flood8
risks reductions in the Netherlands is developed. The proposed model structure is not9
subject to the potential endogeneity bias and measurement error issues associated with10
most applied methods. The driving factors of decision uncertainty are identified through11
stated choices and a set of self-reported decision uncertainty follow-up questions. The12
model simultaneously accounts for the impact of decision uncertainty on individual choices13
and welfare estimates. In the presented case study, uncertain respondents are found to14
make more random choices and select the opt out option more often. Willingness-to-15
pay for flood risk reductions increases after accounting for these behavioural responses to16
decision uncertainty.17
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1. Introduction29
Interest in the impact of decision uncertainty on welfare estimates obtained from stated30
preference (SP) surveys dates back to the period in which the contingent valuation method31
(CVM) was the most widely applied non-market valuation method [see 41, 44, 2, for32
overviews]. The capability of respondents to order alternatives in a choice set or to33
express their willingness-to-pay according to their preferences depends on the extent to34
which they are familiar with the presented trade-offs and the degree of experience they35
have in making such trade-offs. A bias in welfare estimates may arise when the underlying36
econometric model does not account for any form of decision uncertainty respondents37
experience throughout the decision process.38
Within the CVM literature, specifically the dichotomous choice (DC) response for-39
mat, various survey formats and econometric approaches have been developed to ac-40
count for the impact of decision uncertainty on willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates [e.g.41
32, 36, 48, 11, 30]. The implementation of these econometric methods in the context of42
multi-attribute stated preference (MASP) studies is not straightforward. Several MASP43
studies have measured decision uncertainty by positioning a follow-up question directly44
after each choice task [e.g. 34, 12, 5, 26, 27, 39]. The treatment of self-reported deci-45
sion uncertainty has, however, been limited from a methodological perspective. Firstly,46
some papers [e.g. 39] assume decision uncertainty is a result of utility differences across47
the alternatives in the choice set without recognising decision uncertainty itself may in-48
fluence response patterns and consequently the estimated utility functions and welfare49
implications. Secondly, other work has used the self-reported decision certainty responses50
as an explanatory variable in the choice model [e.g. 34, 5] putting the analyst at risk of51
endogeneity bias as well as measurement error (see Section 2.2).52
Integrated Choice and Latent Variable (ICLV) models [e.g. 6] offer an intuitive solu-53
tion to these two problems. ICLV models treat decision uncertainty as a latent construct54
2
simultaneously affecting choice and the response to the follow-up question. Correlation55
between the implicit representation of decision uncertainty in the choice model and its56
explicit representation in the follow-up question is introduced by making the utility func-57
tion and the measurement equation (which explains the reported degree of (un)certainty)58
a function of the same latent variable ‘decision uncertainty’. Directional effects are there-59
fore no longer pre-imposed in the ICLV model; endogeneity and measurement error issues60
are circumvented by treating the follow-up responses as a dependent variable; and the61
welfare implications of decision uncertainty can be traced through the impact of decision62
uncertainty on the choice model.63
In this paper, we explore whether the conceptual benefits of ICLV models outweigh the64
increase in computational costs relative to the criticized approach of using self-reported65
decision uncertainty as an explanatory variable in the utility function. Comparisons are66
conducted at the level of welfare estimates given that measures of model fit are hard67
to compare between traditional choice models and ICLV models. Our results reveal re-68
spondents with a higher level of (latent) decision uncertainty tend to make more random69
decisions, and they adopt a simplifying choice heuristic making them more likely to select70
the status quo (i.e. opt out) option. This particular choice heuristic causes choice models71
not accounting for decision uncertainty to underestimate welfare effects. Models treat-72
ing self-reported decision uncertainty directly as an exogenous variable, however, provide73
comparable welfare estimates to the more complex ICLV model. The advantage of the74
ICLV model is that in addition to tracing the impact of decision uncertainty on choice75
and welfare estimates, it also explains the driving factors of decision uncertainty across76
respondents.77
Our MASP study is conducted in the context of flood risk exposure in the Netherlands78
in the face of climate change. The public nature of Dutch flood risk policy and absence of79
private flood risk insurance causes most people to be unfamiliar with trade-offs regarding80
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their own flood risk exposure. This is a natural application to test our model of decision81
uncertainty. Many alternative applications are likely to exist in the context of resource82
and energy economics. MASP surveys in the context of e.g. wind turbines [31] and water83
quality improvements [43, 37], as published in this journal, could all be facing unfamiliar84
respondents adopting choice heuristics to deal with decision uncertainty.85
2. Decision uncertainty in stated choice surveys86
2.1. Definition87
We define decision uncertainty as the combination of preference uncertainty and choice88
uncertainty. Preference uncertainty is the degree of uncertainty respondents experience in89
assigning a level of utility to an alternative. Preference uncertainty can arise as a result of90
i) unfamiliarity with the good itself, ii) ambiguity or difficulty in interpreting particular91
attributes and iii) the need to infer missing product information. Choice uncertainty92
arises in the process of comparing the available alternatives and evaluating the decision in93
light of the institutional setting. In practice, all the researcher observes is a choice subject94
to both preference and choice uncertainty. Disentangling the two sources of uncertainty95
is difficult (if not impossible), hence the focus of this paper is on the more generic notion96
of decision uncertainty.97
2.2. Measurement and modelling of decision uncertainty in stated choice surveys98
The standard approach to measure decision uncertainty in the MASP studies is to include99
a self-reported decision uncertainty follow-up question directly after each choice task [e.g100
34, 12, 5, 25, 9]. Fenichel et al. [22] and Balcombe and Fraser [4] are exceptions in that101
they present a ‘do not know’ option to respondents in addition to a status quo option. The102
limited variability in methods measuring decision uncertainty in MASP studies highlights103
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the field is not yet as developed as its DC-CVM counterpart.1104
Lundhede et al. [34] use the follow-up questions to evaluate three recoding approaches105
rooted in DC-CVM studies to account for the impact of decision uncertainty on welfare106
estimates. In applying these recoding approaches arbitrary assumptions need to be made107
in order to define the most likely choice if the respondent would have chosen differently.108
In other words, it remains unclear which alternative should be considered as second best109
and used as the basis for recoding.2110
To circumvent the recoding issue, self-reported decision uncertainty is usually directly111
incorporated as an explanatory variable in the choice model [e.g. 34, 5, 9]. Along the lines112
of Arentze et al. [3], Caussade et al. [13] and DeShazo and Fermo [21], the above papers113
explain variations in the variance (scale) of the utility function as a result of self-reported114
decision uncertainty. This approach is consistent with Li and Mattsson [32]’s hypothesis115
that uncertain respondents make more random decisions.116
The self-reported decision uncertainty responses are likely to be associated with mea-117
surement error, an issue Lundhede et al. [34] control for using an Instrumental Variable118
(IV) approach. The IV-approach also circumvents possible endogeneity issues. Namely,119
when the alternatives in the choice task are close to each other in terms of their utility120
levels, then the choice task is likely to be perceived as complex and respondents will re-121
port this in the follow-up questions. Using the self-reported decision uncertainty as an122
explanatory factor in the utility function is likely to introduce correlation between the123
error term of the utility function and the explanatory variables.124
Manski [36] and Scarpa et al. [42] introduce an alternative perspective on decision125
1Kobayashi et al. [30] discuss the strengths and weaknesses of alternative econometric models and
response formats accounting for decision uncertainty applied throughout the DC-CVM literature. The
direct elicitation of choice probabilities, interpreted as a measure of decision uncertainty due to incomplete
future scenarios, as proposed by Manski [36] and implemented by Blass et al. [7] is not included in the
respective overview. The method has also not (yet) been implemented in the MASP literature.
2Beck et al. [5] work with similar arbitrary calibration and weighting approaches.
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uncertainty arising in MASP studies. Respondents in MASP studies tend to be more126
unfamiliar with the presented hypothetical alternatives than with the status quo option,127
which is actually experienced by respondents. Scarpa et al. [42] recommend the inclusion128
of a common error component to deal with this type of uncertainty. In the remainder of129
this paper, we focus on the econometric treatment of the self-reported decision uncertainty130
follow-up responses whilst including the recommended error component.131
2.3. The need for a simultaneous modelling approach132
Two alternative sequential econometric modelling approaches exist in the context of self-133
reported decision uncertainty. First, the IV-approach discussed in the previous section134
finds explanatory variables for self-reported decision uncertainty and subsequently in-135
cludes the measurement equation in the choice model. Second, Brouwer et al. [12] and136
Olsen et al. [39] reverse the process by first estimating a choice model without controlling137
for decision uncertainty. Expected utility differences are then directly implemented to ex-138
plain the decision uncertainty responses. Although in line with the order of presentation139
in the actual survey, the latter approach does not allow us to trace the impact of decision140
uncertainty on the choice model and corresponding welfare measures.141
The above discussion illustrates our critique on current approaches. A model taking142
a one-directional view on decision uncertainty is incomplete. It should take into account143
the impact of decision uncertainty on both the response to the choice task and the self-144
reported decision uncertainty question. We therefore propose an Integrated Choice and145
Latent Variable (ICLV) model in Section 3 which treats decision uncertainty as a latent146
variable. Latent decision uncertainty simultaneously affects the choice model and the147
decision uncertainty responses without imposing a directional effect. In making a decision,148
respondents experience a degree of decision (un)certainty, which is implicitly reflected in149
their decision (e.g. more random decisions) and explicitly in answering the self-reported150
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decision uncertainty follow-up question. Accordingly, the ICLV model provides a more151
natural representation to the problem at hand.152
Like in the IV-approach, the ICLV model uses a set of control variables to explain the153
(latent) decision uncertainty. The use of such a structural equation avoids measurement154
error by recognizing self-reported decision uncertainty responses are an imperfect measure155
of underlying latent decision uncertainty. Similarly, endogeneity issues are avoided by the156
inclusion of appropriate instrumental variables.157
2.4. Two hypotheses158
Given our interest in the impact of decision uncertainty on choice and related welfare159
measures we form two specific working hypotheses tracing the impact of decision uncer-160
tainty on the utility function. First, we maintain the Li and Mattsson [32] hypothesis161
that uncertain respondents tend to have higher variance in the error term of their utility162
function. Accordingly, their choices will have lower informational content. This hypothe-163
sis predicts an increase (decrease) in the variance (scale) of utility as respondents become164
more uncertain. This hypothesis is operationalised by introducing heteroscedasticity in165
the error term across choice tasks [3, 13, 21].166
Alternative hypotheses exist arguing uncertain respondents adopt simplifying choice167
heuristics affecting the structural part of the utility function. For example, Loomes et al.168
[33] develop a model in which uncertain respondents are more likely to pick the status169
quo alternative than is the case for certain respondents. This heuristic finds empirical170
support in Balcombe and Fraser [4] and Swait and Adamowicz [46] and embodies our171
second hypothesis. The hypotheses are tested jointly in the ICLV model.172
3. The ICLV model173
In this section, we provide a formal description of the ICLV model and its components, i.e.174
the structural equation, the choice model and the measurement model, [c.f. 6]. Figure 1175
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Figure 1: The ICLV model
provides a graphical representation. Rectangles represent directly observable variables and176
ellipses latent constructs. The structural equation describes latent decision uncertainty177
as a function of respondent and choice task characteristics. The choice model explains178
the observed choices conditional on the level of latent decision uncertainty as well as179
respondent and choice task characteristics. Note that the researcher only observes a180
choice, while we use the latent notion of utility to explain choice behaviour. Similarly,181
the measurement model explains ‘stated uncertainty’ which is measured on an ordinal182
scale. Like any ordered probit (or logit) model, we map these responses on a continuous183
uncertainty scale and use latent decision uncertainty as the only explanatory variable.3184
3Choice task and respondent characteristics have a direct impact on individual preferences U∗ijt, and
possibly indirect through latent decision uncertainty Cit. We do, however, not believe they also bear a
direct relation with uncertainty I∗it. If that were the case there would be a structural mismatch between
Cit and I
∗
it and the way we measure decision uncertainty. Violations of this assumption would possibly
bias the model parameters. Empirical identification of both the direct and indirect effect is, however,
hard and not common practice in the ICLV literature.
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3.1. The structural equation185
Equation (1) denotes latent decision uncertainty Cit for respondent i in choice task t186
as a linear function of respondent characteristics Ri and a set of choice task specific187
characteristics Wit. Let δ and ω denote the marginal effects associated with respectively188
Ri and Wit. For example, differences in gender and education may result in different189
degrees of decision (un)certainty, while some choice tasks are more difficult than others,190
because the alternatives in the choice set are more comparable to each other.191
Cit = δRi + ωWit + ρi + εit (1)
Since δRi is unlikely to capture all respondent specific variation in decision uncertainty192
across respondents, a respondent specific term ρi is included in the structural equation.193
The latter is added in the form of a normally distributed random parameter with zero194
mean and variance σ2ρ.
4. Finally, εit represents an i.i.d. standard normally distributed195
error term capturing remaining (unexplained) variations in latent decision uncertainty.196
In accordance with the Bolduc et al. [8] normalisation the variance of εit is restricted to197
unity. Cit remains unobserved and takes the form of a continuous variable where higher198
values represent higher degrees of decision uncertainty.199
A critical factor to include in the structural equation is a summary of choice task200
complexity. Shannon [45]’s entropy measure H(Jit) = −
∑
j∈Jit
Pijtln(Pijt) provides a201
natural candidate reaching its maximum when all alternatives in the choice set have the202
same choice probability Pijt. Its dependence on choice probabilities, however, complicates203
4Recent applications of latent variable models in the choice modelling literature (e.g. Abou-Zeid et al.
[1], Daly et al. [17], Daziano and Bolduc [18], Hess and Beharry-Borg [28], Yanez et al. [49]) have focused
on underlying attitudes at the level of the respondent, and have used attitudinal questions at the level of
the respondent as an indicator of these latent attitudes. Note that these responses have been captured
only once per respondent. In contrast, we obtain a degree of self-reported decision uncertainty after each
choice task t = 1, . . . , T .
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operationalising the proposed ICLV model due to endogeneity. One option is to adopt204
an iterative approach where at intermediate parameter values choice probabilities and205
entropy are iteratively updated until the likelihood stabilises. It is not clear whether206
such an iterative approach generates consistent parameter estimates. An easy and often207
available alternative, adopted in this paper, is to estimate a basic choice model on a208
different sub-sample (or pre-test sample) of the survey. The obtained choice probabilities209
then enable researchers to approximate the entropy measure. Other options are to replace210
entropy by alternative measures of complexity not depending on choice probabilities [e.g.211
21].212
3.2. The choice model213
Respondents are assumed to select the alternative generating the highest level of (latent)214
utility. The utility function Uijt = Vijt + ǫijt is specified in the standard linear-additive215
form. Vijt represents the deterministic part of the utility function and ǫijt the stochastic216
term. It is assumed that ǫijt follows a Type I Extreme Value distribution with var(ǫijt) =217
pi2
6λ2
it
. The inverse relation between the scale λit and variance of utility becomes directly218
clear from this expression. In estimation, we rescale the stochastic and deterministic219
part of the utility function by λit such that ǫ
∗
ijt follows an i.i.d distribution with variance220
var(ǫ∗ijt) =
pi2
6
. Equation (2) describes the rescaled utility function U∗ijt.221
U∗ijt = V
∗
ijt + ǫ
∗
ijt = λitVijt + λitǫijt
= exp(τ1Cit) · ((τ2Cit + β1 + ζi)ASCijt + βiXijt) + ǫ∗ijt (2)
The second line of Equation (2) describes the implemented utility function which embod-222
ies the two working hypotheses and Scarpa et al. [42]’s error component. First, the scale223
parameter λit = exp(τ1Cit) is expected to be decreasing in decision uncertainty Cit. Un-224
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certain respondents are expected to display a higher decisional variance, i.e. a lower scale.225
Accordingly, τ1 is hypothesize to be negative.
5 Second, τ2Cit represents the alternative226
decision heuristic that uncertain respondents are more likely to select the status quo (or227
opt out) option. We model this by interacting Cit with the alternative specific constant228
(ASC). Here, ASCijt has a value of one when the alternative is not the status quo. Hence,229
τ2 is hypothesized to take a negative value. β1 measures the average utility associated230
with the ASC unrelated to decision uncertainty. Third, the interaction between ζi and231
the ASC captures the additional variance associated with the hypothetical alternatives.232
ζi takes the form of a normally distributed error component with zero mean and variance233
σ2ζ . Like in Scarpa et al. [42] the error component is introduced at the panel level.234
The remaining part of the deterministic utility function comprises a set of exogenous235
variables Xijt describing the attribute levels of each alternative and possibly other socio-236
economic characteristics. The vector βi measures the marginal utility associated with237
each of these variables, where the subscript i denotes that marginal utility may vary238
across respondents. Heterogeneity in preferences is described by means of a random239
parameter specification using the mixing density f(βi|θ), where θ represents the set of240
hyper-parameters. Conditional on the individual specific parameters and Cit, the choice241
probability of respondent i selecting alternative j from choice set Jit in choice task t, i.e.242
Yit = j, is described by:243
P (Yit = j|Xit, Cit, βi, τ1, τ2) = exp (exp(τ1Cit) ((τ2Cit + β1i)ASCijt + βiXijt))∑Jit
k=1 exp (exp(τ1Cit) ((τ2Cit + β1i)ASCikt + βiXikt))
(3)
5Given that Cit follows a normal distribution with variance 1, the scale of utility follows a log-normal
distribution with expected value exp
(
τ1(δRi + ωWit) +
τ2
1
2
)
. For normalisation purposes − τ21
2
is added
to the specification of λit, i.e λit = exp(τ1Cit − τ
2
1
2
). As such, the expected value of λit reduces to unity
for a base group. See also Fiebig et al. [23], Greene and Hensher [24].
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3.3. The measurement model244
Latent decision uncertainty is measured by the choice task specific follow-up question Iit.245
The translation of the follow-up question is: ‘How certain are you of your choice? ’, where246
the response format comprised a rating scale with five levels: ‘very certain’, ‘certain’,247
‘neither certain nor uncertain’, ‘uncertain’ and ‘very uncertain’, respectively coded as248
[0,1,2,3,4]. Daly et al. [17] put forward the use of an ordered logit model as an appropriate249
specification of the measurement model given the ordered nature of Iit. We prefer to use250
an ordered probit specification to facilitate estimation in a Bayesian framework.6251
Let I+it represent a mapping of Iit on a continuous scale, such that a respondent252
selects Iit = g if I
+
it falls between thresholds ψg−1 and ψg.
7 Given that there are five253
response categories to Iit, only four threshold parameters can be identified. We impose254
ψg > ψg−1 and respectively set ψ0 = −∞ and ψ5 = ∞. Equation (4) then links latent255
decision uncertainty Cit to the responses, where for normalisation purposes we impose256
α = 1. νit represents a zero mean i.i.d. normally distributed stochastic term with variance257
restricted to unity to comply with the ordered probit specification. Accordingly, Equation258
(5) describes the probability that the respondent will indicate the degree of decision259
uncertainty g, where φ denotes the standard normal density function and Φ its cumulative260
density equivalent.261
I+it = αCit + νit (4)
P (Iit = g|Cit) =
∫ ψg
ψg−1
φ
(
I+it − αCit
)
dI+it = Φ(ψg − αCit)− Φ (ψg−1 − αCit) (5)
6Effectively, in estimation we use a re-parameterised version of the ordered probit model similar to
Nandram and Chen [38] reducing autocorrelation in the Gibbs Sampler.
7g refers to the response categories of the follow-up question. g = 1 represents the most certain option
‘very certain’. g = 2, . . . , 5 complies with the order of appearance and g = 5 ends with ‘very uncertain’.
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3.4. Joint likelihood function and complexity of estimation262
When the two sets of dependent variables, namely the observed choices Y and self-reported263
decision uncertainty I, are analysed separately, the researcher estimates a discrete choice264
model and an ordered probit model. The ICLV simultaneously estimates these two models,265
and links them through the latent factor decision uncertainty. The conditional expressions266
P (Yit = j|Cit) and P (Iit = g|Cit) in the joint likelihood function in Equation (6) therefore267
refer to the choice probabilities and the probability of the choice task specific follow-up268
responses. h(Cit|·) describes the structural equation linking the two models. The latent269
nature of Cit in combination with the parameters (βi,ρi; captured in (6) by ∆i) controlling270
for unobserved heterogeneity across respondents requires integration at two levels.271
L(Y, I) =
n∏
i=1
∫
∆i
T∏
t=1
∫
Cit
P (Yit = j|Cit)P (Iit = g|Cit)h(Cit|δ, ω, ρi)dCitq(∆i|θ∆)d∆i (6)
Hess and Train [29] note that ICLV models are computationally intensive when using fre-272
quentist estimation approaches. Therefore, we estimate the model using Bayesian meth-273
ods and work around the integrals by evaluating a set of conditional densities using the274
principles of data augmentation [47].8 Relative to existing sequential approaches to deci-275
sion uncertainty, the ICLV model introduces additional estimation complexity, but allows276
to trace the impact of decision uncertainty on the choice model without imposing direc-277
tional relationships between choices and self-reported decision uncertainty as discussed in278
Section 2.3.279
8The details of the Gibbs Sampler are available from the corresponding author.
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4. The Case Study280
4.1. Valuation of flood risks in the Netherlands281
The case study is based on a Dutch MASP survey concerning flood risk valuation in the282
face of climate change. An online survey was conducted in the provinces of North- and283
South-Holland between February and March 2010. The cities of Amsterdam, The Hague284
and Rotterdam are situated in these densely populated provinces. The Dutch government285
and regional water boards attempt to maintain a flood probability of once every 10,000286
years in the study area. Without additional investments, flood probabilities are expected287
to increase to once every 4,000 years by 2040 due to climate change [35]. Even though288
most of the Dutch are aware that they live below sea level, they are not accustomed to289
making trade-offs regarding their personal flood safety. Water boards and other public290
institutions are primarily responsible for providing and monitoring flood safety levels.291
Decision uncertainty is therefore likely to play a role in this case study.292
4.2. The stated choice experiment293
The choice experiment elicits the extent to which respondents are willing to increase their294
annual (tax) contributions to the water board in order to reduce the probability of a295
coastal flood and the associated consequences. A detailed description of the survey is296
provided in Dekker [19]. The choice experiment is distinctively different from Botzen and297
van den Bergh [10] who present flood risk reductions in the context of a public-private298
partnership where respondents can insure themselves against flood risks as a result of299
climate change. Flood risk insurance is, however, currently not (yet) available in the300
Netherlands. Accordingly, our positioning of flood risk valuation in the context of a pure301
public good is more in line with the current institutional setting.302
In this paper, we focus on the only subsample (one of five) in which respondents303
were presented with a decision uncertainty follow-up question after each choice task.304
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Respondents were presented with ten choice tasks each. The first and tenth choice task305
were identical, where the first task served as an introductory question and the final choice306
task was included as a test for consistency. In the analysis, we focus on choice tasks 2-9,307
resulting in a balanced panel of eight choice tasks per respondent and a total of 1,792308
observations from a sample of 224 respondents.309
In each choice task, two different flood policy scenarios and a status quo option were310
presented to the respondent. Each policy scenario is characterised by four attributes: (i)311
reductions in flood probability; (ii) compensation of material damage to each household312
after a coastal flood has occurred; (iii) available time for local authorities to organise and313
completely evacuate the area under threat; and (iv) an increase in annual tax to the water314
board per household. Table 1 shows the potential levels of each attribute and defines the315
status quo (i.e. opt out) option. An example of a choice card, including the follow-up316
question is presented in Table A.5.317
The experimental design for the sample used here is based on a d-efficient design for a318
linear attributes only MNL model, including an ASC. Local non-zero priors in the design319
were derived from an earlier pre-test sample on which alternative functional forms were320
tested. The design was generated in Ngene [16] and consists of 24 choice cards blocked321
into three groups of eight cards. Each respondent was randomly presented with one of322
these blocks. Positions of the cards within each block were systematically rotated to323
prevent ordering effects [see also 20].324
5. Results325
We present results from five alternative model specifications. The first model presents a326
random parameters logit model where the choices in the SC are analysed without con-327
trolling for decision uncertainty. Model 2 treats the self-reported decision uncertainty328
responses [0,1,2,3,4] as a correct measurement of Cit and includes these directly in the329
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Table 1: Attributes, attribute levels and definition of the Status Quo option
Attribute Possible attribute levels∗
Probability 1 in 4,000 1 in 6,000 1 in 8,000 1 in 10,000
years years years years
(1.5x smaller) (2x smaller) (2.5x smaller)
Compensation 0% 50% 75% 100%
Evacuation time 6 hours 9 hours 12 hours 18 hours
Increase in annual tax e0 e40 e80 e120 e160
∗ The Status Quo option takes the most left (lowest) levels on all policy attributes
choice model. Accordingly, Model 2 might be subject to endogeneity and measurement330
error. Model 3 corrects for these issues by running a sequential IV-model. First a ran-331
dom effects ordered probit model is estimated to obtain parameter estimates for δ and332
ω and thereby derive expected values for Iˆ+it. Then a choice model is estimated using333
Iˆ+it = Cˆit as a control variable. Model 4 presents the Full Information Maximum Likeli-334
hood (FIML) equivalent of Model 3. That is, the conditional posterior for the augmented335
variable I+it not only takes into account the boundaries set by the threshold parameters336
in the ordered probit model (as in Model 3), but also the subsequent impact of Iˆ+it = Cˆit337
on the choice model. Model 5 presents the results of the developed ICLV model. The338
difference between Models 4 and 5 is that the latter treats I+it and Cit as separate entities.339
Effectively, the estimated thresholds parameters associated with the self-reported decision340
uncertainty questions no longer constrain the location of Cit and thereby alter Model 4341
from a sequential into a simultaneous model structure. This subtle change accommodates342
the critiques mentioned in Section 2.3. All models include a separate error-component ac-343
counting for potential scale difference between the scale of the status quo and hypothetical344
alternatives [42].345
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5.1. Choice models and simple IV-estimation346
Table 2 presents the results for the first three model specifications. Model 1 can be347
characterised as an attributes only choice model where the probability, compensation and348
cost attribute follow a lognormal distribution to ensure a strictly positive (negative for349
cost) impact on utility. The evacuation attribute follows a normal distribution in order to350
allow the model to converge. The specification of the choice model does not vary across351
models 1-5 apart from the interaction of decision uncertainty with respectively the ASC352
and scale parameter.353
The parameter and welfare estimates for Model 1 confirm expectations. Respondents354
experience a positive utility from reductions in flood probability, additional compensation,355
and increases in available evacuation time, while they are less likely to select a policy356
alternative with higher costs. The marginal WTP estimates reveal households are willing357
to pay e7.08 per year to reduce flood probabilities by 1,000 years, i.e. from 1/4,000 to358
1/5,000 year. Similarly, an additional percentage of compensation is worth e0.71 per359
household per year and an extra hour of evacuation time e1.90.9 σζ confirms that the360
hypothetical alternatives are associated with additional error variance.361
As expected, both τ1 and τ2 have a negative coefficient in Model 2. The former high-362
lights uncertain respondents exhibit a higher decisional variance. The latter confirms363
uncertain respondents have a higher tendency to select the status quo alternative. Treat-364
ing the follow-up responses as an exogenous explanatory variable in the choice model365
translates into a decisive improvement in model fit as highlighted by the Bayes Factor of366
7.07 relative to Model 1.10 Median WTP estimates for Model 2 are all higher compared367
9During each iteration of the Gibbs Sampler, the median WTP for an attribute was calculated and
stored using the augmented preference parameters across individuals.
10Balcombe et al. (2009) introduced the method of Gelfand and Dey (1994) for model comparison
in the mixed logit framework. This method is not suitable due to the large number of latent variables.
Accordingly, we apply the method of Chib and Jeliazkov (2001) for model comparison.
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Table 2: Results choice models and basic IV-estimation
(1) (2) (3)
Post Post % < 0 Post Post % < 0 Post Post % < 0
Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev
ASC 2.51 0.28 0 1.99 0.27 0 2.81 0.34 0
PROB -2.10 0.23 100 -2.25 0.22 100 -2.11 0.23 100
COMP -2.16 0.18 100 -2.34 0.17 100 -2.24 0.18 100
EVAC 0.49 0.11 0 0.40 0.09 0 0.46 0.11 0
COST -1.79 0.13 100 -2.05 0.14 100 -1.83 0.13 100
Std. PROB 1.34 0.22 0 1.32 0.21 0 1.33 0.21 0
Std. COMP 1.19 0.18 0 1.14 0.18 0 1.24 0.18 0
Std. EVAC 0.83 0.15 0 0.65 0.12 0 0.81 0.15 0
Std. COST 1.14 0.12 0 1.22 0.13 0 1.15 0.12 0
σζ 1.98 0.32 0 1.77 0.28 0 2.01 0.34 0
τ1 - -0.40 0.08 100 0.04 0.15 41
τ2 - -0.44 0.18 99 -0.83 0.43 98
IV-part
Male -0.54 0.20 100
Education -0.14 0.20 75
Experience -0.18 0.31 72
Credibility -0.37 0.14 100
Block 1 0.24 0.25 17
Block 3 0.36 0.24 6
Cardnr 0.02 0.01 4
Entropy 1.22 0.22 0
σρ 1.42 0.08 0
ψ1 -1.78 0.24 100
ψ2 0.47 0.24 2
ψ3 2.48 0.24 0
ψ4 4.31 0.27 0
Obs- Choice 1792 1792 1792
n 224 224 224
ML-Choice -1401.1 -1394.04 -1411.65
BF 7.07 -10.54
WTP PROB 7.08 1.57 0 7.85 1.67 0 7.28 1.58 0
WTP COMP 0.71 0.11 0 0.76 0.12 0 0.69 0.11 0
WTP EVAC 1.90 0.48 0 1.91 0.49 0 1.85 0.48 0
Units:
All marginal median WTP estimates are in eper household per year
Probability - Increase in the denominator of probability by 1,000 years, i.e. from 1/4,000 to 1/5,000
Compensation - Additional percentage of compensation
Evacuation - Additional hour of available evacuation time
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to Model 1, particularly for the probability attribute. The size of the posterior standard368
errors on the WTP estimates, however, indicate there are no significant differences in369
welfare estimates between Models 1 and 2. The increase in median WTP estimates can370
be related to the choice heuristic associated with τ2. Without controlling for the impact371
of decision uncertainty, Model 1 increases the relative importance of the cost attribute to372
accommodate for the fact that uncertain respondents select the status quo more often.373
The sequential IV-estimation procedure presented by Model 3 experiences difficulties374
in linking expected decision uncertainty to observed choice behaviour. τ1 on the one375
hand changes sign and is no longer statistically different from zero. τ2 on the other hand376
suggests respondents are even more likely to select the status option due to decision377
uncertainty. Note, however, that the posterior standard errors on the τ parameters have378
also increased substantially. It is therefore not surprising that Model 3 reveals a lower379
marginal likelihood than Models 1 and 2. We attribute this to the fact that Model 3 does380
not account for the heterogeneity in decision uncertainty represented by ρi given that we381
used a mean-based approach. Based on Model 3, we might conclude that the direct use382
of self-reported decision uncertainty in Model 2 results in an overestimation of median383
WTP. Namely, we only observe a negligible, increase in median WTP estimates relative384
to Model 1. The instability of the τ parameter estimates in Model 3, however, justifies a385
closer examination of decision uncertainty in the context of a sequential FIML approach386
and the proposed ICLV model.387
5.2. Explanatory variables in the IV-approach and structural equation388
The explanatory variables included in the IV-part of Model 3 (and in the remaining389
models) are summarised in Table 3. They represent the driving factors of self-reported390
decision uncertainty. Tables 2 and 4 point out that males are less uncertain than females,391
while education does not seem to have an influence on decision uncertainty; a finding392
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confirmed by both Olsen et al. [39] and Brouwer et al. [12]. Respondents who stated393
that the proposed policy scenarios are credible tend to reflect lower levels of decision394
uncertainty, a finding also reported in Brouwer et al. [12]. The results, however, do not395
confirm that respondent that have previously experienced a flood exhibit lower levels of396
decision uncertainty.11 Four variables are related to choice task characteristics.397
The dummy variables Block 1 and Block 3 indicate that splitting up the design into398
three blocks resulted in Block 2 being slightly easier for respondents compared to the399
two other blocks. Indeed, correlating the blocks with the entropy measure revealed that400
Block 2 contained two relatively easy choice tasks. Decision uncertainty is increasing in401
the length of the stated choice survey as reflected by Cardnr. By altering the order of402
appearance of choice cards across respondents, this effect is most likely related to fatigue403
or boredom effects. Finally, Entropy summarises choice task complexity using Shannon404
[45]’s entropy measure (see Section 3.1). The results confirm that decision uncertainty is405
increasing in the complexity of the choice task.406
Table 3: Overview of explanatory variables in the structural equation
Name Type Mean St.dev Min Max
Male Dummy 0,48 0,50 0,00 1,00
Low & Medium Education Dummy 0,51 0,50 0,00 1,00
Experience Dummy 0,13 0,33 0,00 1,00
Credibility Categorical -0,04 0,71 -2,00 2,00
Block 1 Dummy 0,29 0,45 0,00 1,00
Block 3 Dummy 0,36 0,48 0,00 1,00
Cardnr Continuous 3,50 2,29 0,00 7,00
Entropy Continuous 0,31 0,13 0,00 0,46
11The variables Experience and Credibility are related to specific questions in the survey, where the
former is included as a dummy variable. Credibility is measured as a five-level categorical variable ranging
from ‘very incredible’ (lowest) to ‘very credible’ (highest), which is included in a linear fashion in the
model.
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5.3. FIML and ICLV models407
Table 4 shows large consistencies between the IV-parts in Models 3 and 4. The direct con-408
nection between the ordered probit model and the choice model in Model 4 enables better409
identification of the τ parameters, which again take the expected negative value. Decision410
uncertainty therefore has an impact on individual choice behaviour through making more411
random choices and by adopting alternative decision heuristics. The obtained marginal412
WTP estimates from Model 4 show close resemblance with those obtained from the cri-413
tiqued Model 2. In other words, there might not be too much bias in directly including414
the self-reported decision uncertainty responses in the choice model. Moving from the415
sequential FIML model (Model 4) to the proposed ICLV model (Model 5) shows that the416
parameters of the choice model stay fairly constant. The τ parameters lead to the same417
conclusion that decision uncertainty has an impact on individual choice behaviour, even418
though τ1 shows a slight drop relative to Model 4. The main difference between the two419
models arises in the parameters for the structural and measurement equation. The final420
column in Table 4 reveals estimates for Model 4 are about a factor 0.7 smaller than those421
for Model 5. The scaling is a direct consequence of the fact that additional variance is422
added around latent decision uncertainty in the ICLV model. In fact, when neglecting423
the influence of the choice model the variance of the ordered probit model increases to424
two, explaining why the parameters in the ICLV model are about a factor
√
2 ≈ 1
0.7
larger425
than those in the FIML model.426
The ICLV model has a decisively better fit than the FIML likelihood approach. We427
explain this by noting that the sequential FIML puts most emphasis on explicit decision428
uncertainty represented in the self-reported decision uncertainty measures. Part of the429
224 respondents did not change their self-reported decision uncertainty over the choice430
sequence, while a different pattern may be revealed by the implicit representation of deci-431
sion uncertainty in the choice model. By using both implicit and explicit representations432
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Table 4: Results FIML and ICLV model
(4) (5)
Post Post % < 0 Post Post % < 0 Ratio
Mean StDev Mean StDev (4)/(5)
Choice
ASC 3.02 0.38 0 3.08 0.46 0
PROB -2.00 0.21 100 -2.01 0.23 100
COMP -2.10 0.17 100 -2.12 0.17 100
EVAC 0.51 0.12 0 0.50 0.12 0
COST -1.80 0.14 100 -1.78 0.14 100
Std. PROB 1.31 0.20 0 1.31 0.22 0
Std. COMP 1.15 0.18 0 1.17 0.18 0
Std. EVAC 0.82 0.16 0 0.82 0.15 0
Std. COST 1.21 0.13 0 1.20 0.13 0
σζ 2.34 0.37 0 2.35 0.42 0
τ1 -0.16 0.05 100 -0.10 0.04 100
τ2 -0.35 0.13 100 -0.33 0.14 100
Structural
Male -0.57 0.19 100 -0.82 0.26 100 0.70
Education -0.16 0.19 79 -0.23 0.27 80 0.67
Experience -0.19 0.29 75 -0.27 0.42 75 0.71
Credibility -0.38 0.14 100 -0.52 0.19 100 0.73
Block 1 0.25 0.24 14 0.37 0.32 12 0.69
Block 3 0.39 0.22 5 0.54 0.32 4 0.71
Cardnr 0.02 0.01 3 0.03 0.02 3 0.70
Entropy 1.25 0.22 0 1.75 0.30 0 0.71
σρ 1.39 0.08 0 1.87 0.50 0 0.75
Measurement
ψ1 -1.82 0.18 100 -2.59 0.26 100 0.70
ψ2 0.46 0.18 0 0.64 0.24 0 0.72
ψ3 2.48 0.19 0 3.50 0.24 0 0.71
ψ4 4.36 0.24 0 6.14 0.32 0 0.71
Obs- Choice 1792 1792
n 224 224
ML -3099.2 -3088.9
BF 10.2
WTP PROB 7.80 1.64 0 7.68 1.72 0
WTP COMP 0.76 0.12 0 0.74 0.12 0
WTP EVAC 1.91 0.49 0 1.87 0.50 0
Units:
All marginal median WTP estimates are in eper household per year
Probability - Increase in the denominator of probability by 1,000 years, i.e. from 1/4,000 to 1/5,000
Compensation - Additional percentage of compensation
Evacuation - Additional hour of available evacuation time
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of decision uncertainty, the ICLV model can work around such inconsistencies between433
Cit and I
+
it and improve model fit.434
Overall, the ICLV model illustrates that there exists a correlation between the implicit435
and explicit representation of decision uncertainty in respectively choice behaviour and436
self-reported decision uncertainty. Clearly, there is not a one to one relation between437
the two and possibly a (non-modelled) causal relation exists. As such, the self-reported438
decision uncertainty variable cannot be used as a direct (and exogenous) explanatory439
variable in the choice model from a theoretical perspective. Remarkably, however, is that440
in the current case study the latter naive approach and more advanced FIML and ICLV441
models result in a comparable increase in median WTP estimates. The scale-free median442
WTP estimates highlight the potential for underestimation of welfare effects when not443
controlling for decision uncertainty. It should be noted that these effects are not very444
strong given the size of the posterior standard deviations, but concern is warranted for445
future research.446
6. Conclusions447
In this paper, we propose an Integrated Choice and Latent Variable (ICLV) model to448
account for decision uncertainty in multi-attribute stated preference (MASP) studies.449
Decision uncertainty is treated as a latent variable, which simultaneously affects stated450
choices and responses to a set of follow-up decision uncertainty questions. The ICLV451
model thereby works around potential endogeneity and measurement error issues likely452
to arise when using the follow-up responses as a direct measure of decision uncertainty.453
The proposed ICLV model provides a more intuitive approach to treating decision un-454
certainty compared to existing methods in the MASP literature. The frequently adopted455
assumption of a one-directional impact in sequential models hampers the modelling of the456
complex relation between the implicit and explicit representation of decision uncertainty.457
23
That is, the degree of decision uncertainty present in the actual choice process might458
not always correspond with the stated level of decision uncertainty. The simultaneous459
modelling approach accounts for the correlation between the decision uncertainty respon-460
dents implicitly reveal while making choices and the explicit degree of decision uncertainty461
stated in the follow-up questions, but does not assume they are identical.462
The ICLV model is applied to a MASP experiment on flood risk valuation in the463
Netherlands. Two complementary hypotheses are embedded in the ICLV model. The464
first hypothesis represents the conjecture that uncertain respondents make more random465
decisions reducing the informational content of their responses. The second hypothesis466
controls for uncertain respondents adopting an alternative decision heuristic to simplify467
the choice task. The decision heuristic adopted here accounts for uncertain respondents468
being more likely to select the status quo (or opt out) option. Evidence for both hy-469
potheses is found in the form of significant interactions of latent decision uncertainty470
with respectively the scale of the utility function, and the alternative specific constant,471
whilst including an error-component accounting for potential scale difference between the472
hypothetical and status quo alternatives.473
The finding that WTP estimates increase when controlling for decision uncertainty can474
be related to the second hypothesis. When the model does not control for the adoption475
of an alternative choice heuristic, other model parameters correct for such behavioural476
patterns and become biased. In our case, the respondents either need to become more477
cost sensitive or assign a lower importance to the non-cost policy attributes. Both effects478
translate into lower WTP estimates for the policy attributes which are actually caused by479
uncertain respondents having a higher tendency to select the status quo option. The first480
hypothesis also translates into an increase in marginal WTP estimates, but the magnitude481
of the change is smaller. In general, the observed differences in WTP estimates relative to482
the base model are of minor size, a finding confirmed by Lundhede et al. [34]. Our findings483
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are, however, at stake with conclusions from the contingent valuation (CV) literature,484
where WTP estimates tend to decrease after controlling for decision uncertainty [e.g. 11].485
The controversy might be related to the recoding approaches applied in the CV literature,486
where uncertain ‘yes’ responses are frequently recoded as ‘no’ responses [15].12487
Recoding approaches find their origin in real world behaviour, where uncertain respon-488
dents might be inclined to say ‘yes’ in stated preference studies, but in real-world decision489
would revert to ‘no’.13 The equivalent type of reverting behaviour between stated- and490
real-world behaviour in MASP contexts is less clear. One of the recoding approach put491
forward by Lundhede et al. [34], i.e. recode uncertain responses into the status quo op-492
tion, is the only and probably most realistic approach available yet. Additional research493
on this topic, in combination with the use of alternative response formats to identify de-494
cision uncertainty in MASP studies [e.g. 4, 22, 36] is required. MASP studies on decision495
uncertainty are not as developed as their CVM counterparts in this regard.496
The approach taken in non-recoding studies, including ours, is slightly different. We497
are interested in the trade-offs that people are willing to make after taking away the498
impact of decision uncertainty on their choices. These preferences might not correspond499
with the choices that would be made in the real-world when individuals might still be500
suffering from decision uncertainty. Instead the inferred preferences get closer to the501
utilities and welfare effects experienced by individuals when the uncertainty disappears502
(e.g. when a project is actually implemented). As a result, potential discrepancies between503
the welfare estimates from non-recoding methods and those of recoding approaches are504
best attributed to a (negative) welfare effect of decision uncertainty. The latter relates505
to welfare effects perceived at the moment of decision making. Either way, recoding and506
12Shaikh et al. [44] show that the directional impact on WTP is not necessarily consistent across
recoding approaches. Moreover, Brouwer [11] finds a decrease in WTP without using recoding approaches.
13In the limited number of studies exploring at which certainty cut-off value hypothetical WTP best
simulates actual market behaviour, values vary between 6 and 10 using a scale from 1 to 10 [e.g. 14, 40].
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modelling approaches do suggest that not accounting for decision uncertainty at all is507
likely to introduce some form of bias in the welfare estimates. The size and direction of508
this effect needs to be determined empirically.509
Despite its conceptual advantages, the ICLV model comes with additional computa-510
tional costs. Comparable median WTP estimates are obtained when using more naive511
modelling approaches, such as the direct use of self-reported decision uncertainty in the512
discrete choice model. By being restricted to a single case study, the generalisability of513
this similarity in results is limited and can only be confirmed by applying the same model514
structure to alternative datasets.515
Researchers should question whether the additional effort of setting up a complex516
ICLV model is justified. When the prime interest is in obtaining unbiased welfare esti-517
mates, naive approaches may be sufficient. These simple approaches also do not depend518
on imperfect measures of choice task complexity, such as the Shannon [45] entropy mea-519
sure applied in this paper. The joint modelling framework, however, also opens the road520
for improved welfare estimates, and a renewed focus on the driving factors of decision521
uncertainty. For example, we find that decision uncertainty decreases when respondents522
are presented with easier choice tasks. This is not a call for easier choice tasks, but it523
highlights the delicate balance between designing choice tasks with small utility differ-524
ences, to accurately identify the impact of specific policy attributes, and the opposite525
effect it has on decision uncertainty. Moreover, the random parameter in the structural526
model indicates that significant heterogeneity in decision uncertainty across respondents527
remains unexplained. Partially, this could be related to the simplistic format of the follow-528
up question, but finding better drivers of decision uncertainty can also help in improving529
the formatting and wording of the stated choice experiment. The implications of deci-530
sion uncertainty can thus already be reduced in the design stage rather than correcting531
for it during the data analysis. One possible line of future research is to provide a split532
26
sample with alternative information treatments to see whether survey descriptions (i.e.533
information) affects decision uncertainty.534
Additional lines of future research include the potential use of the iterative estimation535
approach to derive Shannon [45]’s entropy measure , i.e. approximate utility differences536
between alternatives and choice probabilities in the choice task, in the absence of pilot537
data, or alternative data sources. Moreover, we have solely focused on the interaction538
between decision uncertainty and the generic scale parameter. We have done so since our539
empirical study focused on future scenarios, including the status quo. In future research540
it might be explored whether interactions with the included error component are more541
apporpriate, particularly when the status quo is well-known to the respondents, but the542
hypothetical alternatives are relatively unfamiliar.543
The results of this study have no direct implications for Dutch flood risk policies.544
Currently, flood risk policies are evaluated in the context of social cost benefit analysis545
where benefits are quantified using a prevented global damage method, also known as546
the HIS schade en slachtoffer module (version 2.1) . Non-market values, such as derived547
through our MASP study, are not included in those procedures. In the context of climate548
change, Dutch policy makers are, however, looking for alternative ways to quantify policy549
benefits and for public-private partnerships in sharing responsibilities for flood risks [e.g.550
10]. Non-market valuation methods have an important role in this process. The fact that551
respondents lack experience with making decision regarding (future) flood risk exposure552
should, however, be taken into account when using MASP studies for these purposes.553
Similar concerns regarding the impact of decision uncertainty on welfare estimates should554
be taken into account when applying MASP studies to any non-market valuation study,555
including those in the field of energy and resource economics.556
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Appendix A. Example of a choice card697
Table A.5: Example of a choice card
Plan A Plan B Status Quo
Probability 1 in 8,000 1 in 10,000 1 in 4,000
years years years
(2x smaller) (2.5x smaller)
Compensation 75% 50% 0%
Evacuation time 9 hours 18 hours 6 hours
Increase in annual tax e120 e160 e0
Choice:   
How certain are you of your choice?
Very Certain Certain Neither certain nor uncertain Uncertain Very Uncertain
    
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